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CHICKEN LITTLE LIVES: THE ANTICIPATED AND




[A] new epoch had commenced, one in which a hundred
commentaries and questions-if not flowers-have
blossomed and old verities have been challenged.'
This quotation accurately describes the aftermath of congressional
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate responsibility legislation in 2002.2
It also captures how many lawyers perceived proposed regulations as a radical
departure threatening basic principles of lawyer independence and client
confidentiality. Ironically, the statement was actually made in a 1978 article
discussing the case of SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,3 the most
well-known securities case concerning a lawyer's obligation to disclose
information that would be damaging to his or her client.
In National Student Marketing, the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) filed a complaint against various defendants, including two
prominent law firms and several firm partners.4 The SEC alleged that the
lawyers had aided and abetted client wrongdoing because they "refused to
issue the opinion letters and should have insisted that the financial statements
be revised and the shareholders be resolicited. ',5 If the law firms failed to
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I Junius Hoffman, On Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud-The
Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1390 (1978).
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
3 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
4 Id. at 686-87.
5 SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
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ignore this advice, "the attorneys should have ceased representing their
respective clients" and, under the circumstances, notified the plaintiff SEC
concerning "the misleading nature of the financial statements."6 Notably, the
SEC did not condemn the lawyer for actually participating in client
wrongdoing, but rather for failing to take action to prevent the client's
misconduct.
The National Student Marketing case sparked a debate on the role of
securities lawyers. As noted by the court in National Student Marketing:
The filing of the complaint in this proceeding generated
significant interest and an almost overwhelming amount of
comment within the legal profession on the scope of a
securities lawyer's obligations . . . to the investing public.
The very initiation of this action, therefore, has provided a
necessary and worthwhile impetus for the profession's
recognition and assessment of its responsibilities in this area.8
A reading of the National Student Marketing complaint reveals the SEC
position that securities lawyers owe a duty to the investing public. In speeches
and public pronouncements, SEC Commissioners promoted the view that
securities lawyers, as gatekeepers, should function more like auditors than
advocates. 9
The aggressive enforcement strategy of the SEC and public
pronouncements of SEC Commissioners triggered a response from the
American Bar Association (ABA).'0 In 1975, the ABA issued a policy
statement rejecting the SEC's position." The ABA Policy Statement warned
(CCH) 93,360, at 91,913 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1972).
6 Id.
7 Kenneth F. Krach, The Client-Fraud Dilemma: A Need for Consensus, 46 MD. L.
REv. 436, 460 & n.147 (1987).
8 Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. at 714 (footnote omitted).
9 For example, in a published speech, SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer described
securities lawyers as the keepers of stop and go signals in securities transactions. See
Commissioner Sommer's Speech on "The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer,"
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,631 (Jan. 1974). Another SEC
Commissioner, Roberta Karmel, challenged this view and the SEC position that securities
lawyers owed duties to the public. See Roberta S. Karmel, Duty to the Target: Is an
Attorney's Duty to the Corporation a Paradigm for Directors?, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 678
(1988).
1 For the ABA's response, see Statement of Policy Adopted by American Bar
Association Regarding Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to
the Compliance by Clients with Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 31 Bus. LAw 543 (1975).
I Id. at 544-45.
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that lawyers' ability to counsel and defend clients could be seriously impaired
if lawyers are forced to disclose client confidences to third parties, including
the SEC.'
2
Despite the protests of the organized bar, SEC enforcement actions and
policy statements caused securities firms to reexamine their handling of
securities representation and responsibilities.13 At a corporate level, firms
improved their due diligence procedures and opinion letter policies. Such
improvements could help firms minimize their liability exposure. Risk averse
firms "anxious to avoid an SEC prosecution began to err by placing too much
emphasis on their duty of candor to the government.' 4 On an individual level,
the looming threat of SEC action may have affected the advice that securities
lawyers gave their clients. As a SEC lawyer who moved into private practice, I
can attest to the fact that the SEC position influenced my own conception of
my role. Admittedly, the risk of liability also influenced my approach to
representation. 15
Within fifteen years, financial institution lawyers faced a similar threat of
regulator suit. Following the savings and loan debacle, financial institution
regulators, including the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), took an aggressive posture in suing
professionals who represented regulated entities. Professionals in both large
and small firms faced government claims. 16  New legislation called the
Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of
12 Id. at 544.
13 See Krach, supra note 7, at 461-62.
14 Id. at 462 (footnote omitted).
15 For example, the risk of liability played a role in screening new securities clients.
16 See Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L Crisis
Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEx. L. REV. 639, 640 (1994) (noting that
"[f]ederal banking agencies have brought crushing professional liability suits or administrative
enforcement actions against more than twenty of our nation's largest law firms"). "All told,
the government has instituted over 90 civil or administrative actions against lawyers who
represented failed thrifts." Id. at 640 n. 1 (citing Harris Weinstein, Attorney Liability in the
Savings and Loan Crisis, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 53, 53). Harris Weinstein is the former Chief
Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision. Joseph E. Addiego III, Comment, FIRREA
Disrupts Traditional Notions of Attorney Duty by Exposing Lawyers, as Financial Institution-
Affiliated Parties, to Personal Liability, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 969, 971 (1993). "Between
1989 and 1992, the government recovered $1.7 billion from claims against professional
advisers associated with failed banks and thrifts." Nancy Amoury Combs, Comment,
Understanding Kaye Scholer: The Autonomous Citizen, the Managed Subject and the Role of
the Lawyer, 82 CAL. L. REV. 663, 664 n.2 (1994) (citing Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on
Kaye Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1023 n.12 (1993)).
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1989 also enhanced the regulator's enforcement tools.' 7 FIRREA empowered
government officials to file administrative actions against institution-related
parties, including lawyers and accountants.' 8  Following the adoption of
FIRREA, government officials frequently compared the fiduciary duties of
lawyers representing financial institutions to the fiduciary duties of lawyers
handling securities transactions.'
9
In March of 1992, the OTS shocked the legal world by using this statutory
authority in suing the prestigious firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler ("Kaye Scholer").2 ° In its Notice of Charges, the government sought
damages and restitution totaling $275 million arising from actions taken by the
law firm when representing Charles Keating and the Lincoln Savings and Loan
Association. 2' The OTS also obtained a temporary cease and desist order
freezing the firm's assets.22
Although the case settled within ten days with Kaye Scholer paying $41• 23 ..
million, the government action sparked a controversy. Critics questioned the
government tactic as a "heavy-handed" attack on independent counsel.24
In a report on the asset freeze, the Committee on Professional
Responsibility of the City Bar of New York concluded that lawyers learned
from Kaye Scholer' s treatment that if "they represent a client vigorously, they
risk financial ruin before an action against them is even brought before a
judge., 25 Others defended government action as a legitimate use of regulatory
17 For a discussion of FIRREA, see Paul T. Clark et al., Regulation of Savings
Associations Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
45 Bus. LAW. 1013 (1990).
1s See Addiego, supra note 16, at 970-71.
19 Diane L. Karpman, "Catch of the Day-Catch 22 ": Anticipating, Understanding and
Defending NonClient Claims, and How the S&L Crisis May Impact Enron, 126 PRAc. L. INST.
79, 97 (2002).
20 Peter C. Kostant, When Zeal Boils Over: Disclosure Obligations and the Duty of
Candor of Legal Counsel in Regulatory Proceedings after the Kaye Scholer Settlement, 25
ARIz. ST. L. J. 487, 487-88 & n.2 (1993).
21 Id. at 487-88.
22 Id. at 488.
23 Id.
24 See, e.g., Accountability by Sledgehammer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1992, at A24
(condemning the government's use of "heavy-handed tactics" and criticizing the government's
"novel demands that the lawyers abandon their customary loyalty to clients"). See also Keith
R. Fisher, Neither Evaders nor Apologists: A Reply to Professor Simon, 23 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 341,356 (1998) (discussing the legitimacy of the bar's concern that the OTS position
departed from "generally accepted and well-recognized professional norms").
25 Edward A. Adams, Panel Condemns Kaye Scholer Asset Freeze, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 1,
1992, at 1 (quoting a report issued by the Committee on Professional Responsibility of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York). The Committee report recommended
(continued)
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powers to recoup losses of at least $275 million.26 Both sides of the debate
recognized that financial institution lawyers were functioning in a new
regulatory world in which the threat of government enforcement action forced
lawyers to reexamine their role in representing clients.27
A decade later, lawyers found themselves discussing the same issues
following congressional enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.2' The
Act, passed in reaction to high profile corporate scandals including Enron and
Worldcom, was designed "to protect investors by improving the accuracy and
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities law, and for
other purposes. 29 Section 307 of the statute directed the SEC to issue rules
setting forth minimum standards of conduct for lawyers appearing and
practicing before the SEC in any way in the representation of issuers.3° In
addition to the "general grant" of authority to issue rules, the statute mandated
the adoption of one specific rule requiring that lawyers report "up the
corporate ladder" evidence of corporate misconduct.3  Pursuant to this
amending FIRREA to require OTS to provide a law firm notice of an asset freeze before it
becomes effective. Id. at 5.
26 See, e.g., Kostant supra note 20, at 489 (asserting that the government held Kaye
Scholer to well-established standards of professional conduct).
27 Susan Saab Fortney, OTS vs. the Bar: Must Attorneys Advise Directors that the
Directors Owe a Duty to the Depository Fund?, 12 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 373, 395 (1993)
(concluding that government actions forced lawyers to reassess their role and liability exposure
in representing financial institutions).
28 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
29 N. Henry Simpson et al., After the Fall: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 66 TEx. B.
J. No.3, Mar. 2003, at 226, 227. As described by Professor Jonathan R. Macey, the statute was
"designed to remedy perceived deficiencies in market processes by which public corporations
interact with the investing public." Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron,
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus
Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 350 (2003).
30 Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future
Enrons?, 48 VIL. L. REv. 1097, 1098-99 (2003) (noting that the affirmative "obligations will
now have the force of federal law, including the potential that violations will be subject to SEC
enforcement proceedings").
31 Developments in the Law-Corporations and Society, Lawyer Conduct and
Corporate Misconduct, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2227, 2228 (2004) [hereinafter Lawyer Conduct
and Corporate Misconduct]. As provided in the statute, the rule should require that counsel
report evidence of a 'material violation of the securities law or breach of
fiduciary duty' to the chief legal counsel or the CEO of the corporation. If
the suspected violation or breach is not addressed, the attorney must then
present the evidence to the audit committee, another appropriate
(continued)
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directive, the SEC on January 29, 2003 proposed Part 205, entitled "Standards
of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer" (SEC Standards).32
The proposed SEC Standards sparked a heated debate on the necessity and
effect of the changes. As was the reaction to the National Student Marketing
and Kaye Scholer cases, many lawyers saw the legislation with the proposed
standards as threatening the relationship between lawyers and their corporate
clients. A firestorm of criticism and commentary hit the press.33 Much like
the bar's reaction to FIRREA, the new legislation and SEC proposed standards
also provoked responses from the organized bar,34 law firms, and individual
lawyers.
Part II of this Article reviews the organized bar's reaction to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. Part Ill focuses on law firms' response to the legislation.
Finally, Part IV considers the views of individual corporate and securities
lawyers ("corporate lawyers") who have reflected on the short and long term
effect of the legislation and related SEC Standards.
II. ORGANIZED BAR REACTION
Before Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley, 2001-2002 ABA President
Robert Hirshon appointed the ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility
("Task Force") to examine issues related to corporate responsibility and
wrongdoing. 35  The Task Force examined "the framework of laws and
committee, or the board of directors.
John F.X. Peloso & Stuart M. Sarnoff, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Whom Does It Affect
and How?, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 2002, at 3.
32 Lawyer Conduct and Corporate Misconduct, supra note 31, at 2230-31 (citing 17
C.F.R. pt. 205).
33 E.g., Leslie Wharton, Hazards for the Attorney-Client Relationship: Sarbanes-Oxley
Act's Reporting Requirements Pose Problems for Privileged Communications, N.Y. L.J., Nov.
18, 2002, at S1 (concluding that the proposed SEC rule is "more likely to inhibit
communications between corporations and their counsel and engender collateral litigation over
privilege issues than to further goals articulated by Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act").
34 For an excellent summary of the organized bar's response to FIRREA and the
litigation against professionals who represented failed financial institutions, see William H.
Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of
Evasion and Apology, 23 LAw & SoC. INQUIRY 243, 263-67 (1998).
35 Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 59
Bus. LAW. 145, 145-46 (2003) [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report]. The Task Force was
charged with examining "systemic issues relating to corporate responsibility arising out of the
unexpected and traumatic bankruptcy of Enron and other Enron-like situations which have
shaken confidence in the effectiveness of the governance and disclosure systems applicable to
public companies in the United States." Id. at 145-46.
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regulations and ethical principles governing the roles of lawyers, executive
officers, directors, and other key participants. 36 In fulfilling its charge, the
Task Force submitted a Preliminary Report on July 16, 2002, recommending
reforms relating principally to corporate governance and lawyers' professional
responsibility. With respect to the professional conduct of lawyers, the
Preliminary Report "proposed a number of changes to the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, including a recommendation that lawyers be given
broader permission to disclose information about corporate misconduct and
that [lawyers] be required to disclose confidential information to prevent
criminal misconduct."
38
After the Task Force submitted its Preliminary Report, 2002-2003 ABA
President Alfred P. Carlton, Jr. reappointed "the Task Force to draw 'broad
public policy conclusions which lead to policy recommendations for the ABA
House of Delegates ... that go beyond the technical aspects of corporate
securities law and the ABA's model rules of professional conduct.' 39  In
continuing its work, the Task Force performed an important role in providing
the ABA's opinion to the SEC as the SEC developed minimum standards of
professional conduct pursuant to section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley. 4°
The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation and proposed standards requiring "up-the-
ladder" reporting impacted the recommendations that the Task Force made in
its final report. Although the Task Force's Final Report rejected such
inflexibility in proposed changes to Model Rule 1.13, the Final Report
encouraged more "up-the-ladder" reporting by including a presumption in the
proposed Rule 1.13 .42 As proposed in the Task Force's Final Report, the
presumption required "reporting to a higher authority within the organization.
. unless 'the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best
interest of the organization to do so."43 In August 2003, the ABA House of
Delegates adopted the ABA Task Force's proposed revision of Model Rule
1.13 with a floor amendment related to the standard for triggering reports.44
36 Id. at 146.
37 Id.
38 LOMAR News Briefs, LAW OFF. MGMT. & ADMIN. REP., (The Inst. of Mgmt. &
Admin., New York, N.Y.), Jan. 2003, at 8, 9.
39 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 35, at 146 (quoting ABA President Alfred P.
Carlton, Jr. in his testimony given to the Task Force in Chicago on Sept. 20, 2002) (alteration
in original).
40 LOMAR News Briefs, supra note 38, at 9.
41 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility and
the 2003 Changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 35,
42-43 (2003) (tracing the history of the rule changes).
42 See id. at 41-43.
43 Id. at 42-43 (quoting MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003)).
" Id. at 45.
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During the same meeting, the ABA House of Delegates also adopted the
extension of the permissive disclosure provisions recommended by the ABA
Ethics 2000 Commission.45 The broader mandatory disclosure provisions
recommended in the Preliminary Task Force Report were withdrawn from the
Task Force's Final Report.4 6
The history of the SEC Standards promulgated under the authority of
section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley and the proposed changes to the ABA Model
Rules reveals that both the SEC and organized bar influenced each other.
Apparently, practitioner outcry and organized bar opposition has chilled the
SEC's enthusiastic rush to adopt rule provisions requiring lawyers to make an
immediate "noisy withdrawal" when corporate officials of public companies
do not appropriately address reported material violations.47 At the same time,
the ABA abandoned some arguments first asserted in opposition to SEC
regulation of lawyer conduct.4f As explained by one commentator, "[T]he
practicing bar has staked out fallback positions in the face of the commission's
seeming determination to press through with some kind of requirement for
attorneys to report wrongdoings of clients. '49
Lawyers are swimming in unsettled waters because of the uncertainty
surrounding the SEC proposed standards and the recently adopted revisions to
the Model Rules. Until such time that the SEC proposed rules are actually
effective and states adopt the Model Rule revisions, lawyers should comply
with the provisions of applicable state ethics rules. At the same time, the SEC
will likely take the position that Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC Standards
govern the responsibility of lawyers representing issuers of securities. In some
states, this has created the "possibility of a significant collision between the
regulation of lawyers by the SEC and the regulation of lawyers by state
supreme courts."5  As suggested by Professor Lawrence Hamermesh, this
45 Id. at 35, 39.
46 Id. at 38-39 (noting that the Preliminary Task Force's mandatory disclosure proposal
encountered severe criticism).
47 See ABA Urges SEC Not to Exceed Sarbanes-Oxley Mandate Without Extended
Comment Period, METRO. CORP. COuNS. (Mountainside, N.J.), Jan. 2003 (outlining the ABA's
comment letter relating to the SEC's proposed standards implementing Sarbanes-Oxley).
48 See Gary Young, Shifting Tactics on SEC Proposal: Attorneys Stake Out Fallback
Positions with Passage Likely, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 14, 2003, at A15 (noting that other practitioner
groups, such as the American Corporate Counsel Association, have also changed their stance).
In contrast to an earlier comment letter to the SEC, an April 4, 2003 comment letter did not
argue that the SEC "lack[ed] congressional authority to issue a reporting-out rule or that state
disciplinary bodies are adequately policing the conduct of securities lawyers." Id.
49 Id.
so George A. Riemer, SEC v. State Bars? Preemption Showdowns Could Be on the
Horizon, 64 DEC. OR. ST. B. BuLL. 21 (reviewing positions taken by bar groups in Washington
and California).
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may leave lawyers in a quandary if they want to disclose information as
permitted by the SEC rule, but the state rule prohibits such disclosure.51 Until
uncertainty is resolved, the safest course of action may be for lawyers to limit
disclosures to what state ethics rules permit, rather than relying on the
permissive disclosure provisions under the SEC Standards.52
LII. FIRM RESPONSE
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the proposed "reporting out" rule,
firm lawyers have not delayed in responding to the provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley and the new SEC Standards that became effective on August 5, 2003.s3
Within a short time after passage, the new legislation and SEC proposed
standards sparked a flurry of commentary and conferences.54 Law school
symposia explored theoretical and policy issues such as liability of lawyers as
gatekeepers, while continuing legal education programs concentrated on
practical compliance issues.5 6 For practitioners, educational sessions provided
guidance on advising corporate clients of their responsibilities and liabilities.
Select programs focused on professional responsibility issues related to law
firm compliance with new regulatory requirements.51
Beginning in 2003, lawyers and their firms appeared to go through three
stages. First, lawyers and firm managers attempted to analyze both the new
law, regulatory requirements, and practice ramifications. 5 8 Second, firms that
51 Mark Hansen, State Fights the SEC: State Bar Warns Lawyers Against Permissive
Disclosure Under SEC's New Rules, 34 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Aug. 29,2003, available at WL,
34 ABAJEREP 1 (citing Lawrence Hamermesh, Professor of Law, Widener University School
of Law).
52 See id.
53 See Sue Reisinger, Coping with Tighter Rules for Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 11,
2003, at 8 (referring to an SEC spokesman who said that the SEC "received about one question
a week about the reporting rules").
54 See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Forward to Symposium: Evaluation and Response to
Risk by Lawyers and Accountants in the U.S. and E. U., 29 J. CORP. L. 217 (2004) (noting that
the symposium examines the regulation of lawyers and gatekeepers in the United States and
Europe).
55 See, e.g., id. at 217.
56 See, e.g., Calendar of Coming Events, N.Y. L.J., June 21, 2004, at 2 (referring to an
upcoming continuing legal education program entitled "Sarbanes Oxley: A Complete Review
and Update").
57 For example, the Dallas-based firm of Haynes and Boone, L.L.P. presented a
seminar for legal officers on the SEC's new standards of professional conduct mandated by
Sarbanes-Oxley. Press Release, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Haynes and Boone Presents
"Sarbanes-Oxley: Attorney Standards of Professional Conduct," (Feb. 14, 2003), at
http://www.haynesboone.com/about/press-detail.asp?pressid= 158.
58 See Reisinger, supra note 53; Hansen, supra note 51.
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represent public companies and issuers adopted policies and implemented
procedures to enable them to comply with new regulations. 59 Third, firm
managers recognized that corporate clients needed assistance in complying
with the new legislation and regulations. 6°
Finns used different approaches in assisting corporate clients. Commonly,
firms provided client newsletters, client advisories, or personalized letters
describing the new law and regulations.61 In these communications, firms
62invited client representatives to contact firm lawyers for additional assistance.
This reveals how the new laws and regulations provided a business
development opportunity for firms. As explained by one commentator, "The
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley last summer created a huge and immediate need for
governance expertise, and law firms moved quickly to get a piece of the action,
cobbling together corporate governance practices from existing corporate,
litigation, securities and other practice groups. 63 Lawyers in these special
practice groups would assist corporations in complying with the requirements
of Sarbanes-Oxley and related regulations. 64 Thus, the new regulatory
environment created opportunities for firms to attract new clients and generate
65additional work from existing clients.
59 See Michael Bobelian, Sarbanes-Oxley: Law Firms Negotiate a New Reality, N.Y.
LAw., Mar. 18, 2004, at http://www.nylawyer.com/news/04/03/031804d.html. Referring to
firms instituting structural reforms, James Jones, a consultant with Hildrebrant International,
noted that "'firms are taking risk management much more seriously,' by training lawyers about
the new rules, formalizing once loosely drawn processes, and creating internal groups to study
and solve problems." Id.
60 The following description of the assistance provided by the Corporate Governance
Group at Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP captures the type of guidance firms provide. "In relation
to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, we advise clients on the expanded disclosure requirements,
accelerated timing of disclosure, requirements for independent board and board committee
members, prohibitions on personal loans to corporate executives, regulation of insider trading,
and certifications by senior corporate officials." Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP, Practice Areas,
Corporate Governance, http://www.gardere.com/PracticeAreas-andIndustry-Teams/-
PracticeArea?id=84 (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
61 See, e.g., SEC Deadline for Updating Corporate Codes of Ethics/Conduct, CLIENT
ALERT (Baker & McKenzie, Chicago, Ill.), July 16, 2003, at 2 (on file with Capital University
Law Review) (inviting clients to contact firm lawyers for assistance with review or creation of a
Global and Domestic Code of Ethics/Conduct).
62 Id.
63 Tamara Loomis, Scandals Lead to a New Kind of Executive, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
May 5, 2003, available at http://www.palawlibrary.com/cgibin/retrieve.cgi/file_45686?-
mode=disp&text=scandals (stating that the purpose of forming a practice group is to deal with
interrelated issues that arise under the "governance umbrella").
64 See id.
65 See Peter H. Ehrenberg & Anthony 0. Pergola, Project: Corporate Counsel-Law
(continued)
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Although larger firms are the ones appearing to use Sarbanes-Oxley as a
business development vehicle, firms of all sizes should assess their own needs
in considering the implementation of policies and procedures to comply with
the SEC Standards. Some malpractice insurers, such as the Attorneys'
Liability Assurance Society, Inc., the risk retention group that includes many
of the nation's largest law firms, recommended that firms consider adopting a
written polic, designating a firm committee to work on Sarbanes-Oxley
compliance. In-house counsel may also require that their outside counsel
adopt written policies.67
Integral features of a policy include mandatory training for all firm lawyers
and procedures for reporting information that could be material for securities
law disclosure. Educational sessions should include supervised and
supervisory lawyers, as well those lawyers who do not handle securities work.
All firm lawyers could receive at least general training, while securities
lawyers should obtain more intensive training.
Firms that do not handle securities matters should consider modifying their
engagement letters to clarify that the firm is not being engaged to perform
securities work. Firm audit response letters might also clarify that the firm is
not securities counsel for the client.
Firms, Corporate Governance Self-Audits: Policing Yourself Before You Get Policed, METRo.
CORP. CouNs. (Mountainside, N.J.), 2004 (referring to the developing cottage industry of
consultants), available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com-/article.php?EntryNo=1647.
Corporations can also obtain the assistance of consultants who provide Sarbanes-Oxley
compliance services. Id.
66 In describing firms' response to the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and the related
SEC Standards, one commentator notes that "[tihe most important step has come in the form of
internal committees empowered to develop policies and respond to questions that may arise
among their practicing attorneys." Bobelian, supra note 59.
67 Sarbanes-Oxley In-Housekeeping; General Counsel Adapt to the Post-Enron
Business Climate, TEx. LAW., Dec. 29,2003, available at LEXIS, News & Business, News, By
Individual Publication. According to Mark C. Hill, senior vice president and chief
administrative officer for RadioShack Corp., his corporation requires that outside counsel have
written policies and "embrace" the corporation's policy. Id. Similarly, Katherine K. Combs,
deputy general counsel, vice president, and corporate secretary for Exelon Corp., recommends
that "law firms and corporations should both draft reporting-up policies and exchange copies of
their policies when working together." Melissa Nann, 'Reporting-Up' Procedures Under
Sarbanes-Oxley Urged, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 19,2003, available at http://www.palaw-
library.com/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi/file_46935?mode=disp&text=reporting+up.
68 Nann, supra note 67.
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IV. EFFECT ON PRACTICE OF INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS
When first proposed, the SEC Standards prompted warnings that the
Standards would fundamentally change the attorney-client relationship.69
Despite these warnings, experienced practitioners report that the "effects have
been moderate., 70 Simon Lorne, an American Bar Association task force
member who focuses on reviewing the responses of law firms to section 307 of
Sarbanes-Oxley, believes that "'[tihere has been precious little evidence of
actual adverse effects' in attorney-client relations." Mr. Lome predicts that
"the theoretical risk [will] turn into a practical risk" once the SEC takes
enforcement action against a law firm.
Even though the SEC has not taken enforcement action against practicing
lawyers, one firm's withdrawal from representation resulted in national press
coverage. 3 In December 2003, The New York Times reported that a partner at
the firm of Akin, dump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld cited section 307 of Sarbanes-
Oxley in a December 12, 2003 letter to the board of TV Azteca, Mexico's
second-largest broadcaster.74 In the letter, the partner told the board that Akin
Gump was withdrawing as TV Azteca's counsel on a pending bond offering
because of a dispute related to disclosure obligations concerning a
transaction.75 On the day following the news story, Reuter's reported a nine
76percent drop in TV Azteca' s share price. Interestingly, the leak of the letter
to the press effectively converted an up-the-ladder report within the
organization to a noisy withdrawal.
This incident suggests that corporate lawyers are attempting to comply
with the provisions of section 307 and the SEC Standards. Although state
ethics rules may require that lawyers act in the best interest of the organization-
client, those rules, which are based on the pre-2003 version of Model Rule
1.13, only mention 7oing "up-the-ladder" among other remedial measures a
lawyer "may" take.7 Now, lawyers in Akin Gump's position no longer have
69 Bobelian, supra note 59.
70 Id. at 3.
71 Id. (quoting Simon Lorne).
72 Id.
73 Patrick McGeehan, Lawyers Take Suspicions on TVAzteca to Its Board, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2003, at C 1.
74 Id.
75 Id. "The company, TV Azteca, has had a long-running dispute with lawyers in New
York about the need for greater disclosure about transactions that could have yielded a profit of
more than $100 million to the company's billionaire chairman and controlling shareholder,
Ricardo B. Salinas Pliego." Id.
76 TV Azteca Debt Deal Under Review, Shares Plunge, REUTERS, Dec. 24, 2003.
77 Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical
Issues, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIAscos AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 571, 584-85 (Nancy B.
(continued)
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an option when circumstances trigger the obligations under the new SEC
Standards.
The remaining question is whether the SEC Standards actually have
changed the conduct of corporate lawyers. To obtain practitioners' opinions
on the actual effect of the SEC Standards, I conducted an on-line survey 8 and
my own interviews of experienced corporate lawyers. The methodology I
used, while not scientific, enabled me to obtain feedback from thirty-six
lawyers.
Members of the following specialty bar groups received the e-mail
message inviting them to click an Internet web link to complete a ten-question
on-line survey: The Dallas Bar Association Securities Section,79 the Houston
Bar Association Securities Litigation and Arbitration Law Section, 80 the Ohio
State Bar Association Securities Regulation and Tender Offer Sections, and
the New York State Bar Association Business Law Section Committee on
Securities Regulation. Twenty-five lawyers completed the on-line survey.8
In addition to the survey responses, I also obtained more in-depth responses
from interviews with corporate lawyers in Illinois, Ohio, New York, and
Texas.
82
The on-line survey yielded twenty-six responses from a range of corporate
lawyers in different regions and practice settings.83 The respondents worked in
Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds. 2004). In referring to the previous version of Model Rule
1.13, Professor Roger Cramton explains that subpart (b) of the rule is ambiguous in reciting a
number of factors a lawyer should consider and listing three measures, "including going up the
corporate ladder to the board of directors, that the lawyer 'may' take, along with other
unspecified measures." Id. At its 2003 meeting, the ABA House of Delegates voted to change
the revisions of Model Rule 1.13 to create a presumption requiring lawyers to go "up-the-
ladder." See Hamermesh, supra note 41, at 35, 42-43.
78 Susan Saab Fortney, Corporate/Securities Practice Survey (2004) (unpublished
survey, on file with author) [hereinafter Corporate/Securities Practice Survey].
79 Email from Susan Saab Fortney, Associate Dean for Student Affairs, Texas Tech
University School of Law, to the Dallas Bar Securities Section (July 14, 2004, 11:03 AM) (on
file with author).
80 Email from Susan Saab Fortney, Associate Dean for Student Affairs, Texas Tech
University School of Law, to the Houston Bar Association Securities Litigation and Arbitration
Law Section (July 19, 2004, 12:22 PM) (on file with author).
81 See Susan Saab Fortney, Sarbanes Oxley Survey Responses (2004) (unpublished
survey responses, on file with author) [hereinafter Sarbanes Oxley Survey Responses].
82 See Susan Saab Fortney, Outline of Fortney Interview (2004) (unpublished outline,
on file with author) [hereinafter Outline of Fortney Interview].
83 Sarbanes Oxley Survey Responses, supra note 81.
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firms and offices of varying sizes.84 Fifty-percent indicated that their firms
consisted of more than one hundred lawyers, including all branch offices.8 5
The majority of survey res ondents (77%) were transactional lawyers
rather than securities litigators. The largest percentage of respondents (46%)
were very experienced corporate lawyers who had practiced corporate law for
over twenty years.87 A slight majority (54%) indicated that more than 75% of
their practice was devoted to corporate and securities work.88
The respondents were evenly split when asked the following question:
"Do you believe that complying with the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and the
new SEC Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys have changed the
way in which you represent public entities? '89 The outcome changes when
focusing only on the thirteen respondents who practice in firms of over one
hundred lawyers.9° Nine of those thirteen respondents reported that complying
with the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and the related standards indeed has
changed their practices. 9'
The descriptions of how compliance has changed their practices largely
fall in to three categories: (1) effects on the clients' attitudes, expectations,
and conduct, (2) effects on the nature and amount of work, and (3) effects on
lawyers' dealings with constituents.
92
In the first category of descriptions, comments reveal that client
representatives are now more concerned and cautious.9 3 This heightened
84 Id.
85 Susan Saab Fortney, Survey Results: Corporate Securities Survey (2004)
(unpublished survey results, on file with author) [hereinafter Survey Results: Corporate
Securities Survey]. The balance of respondents were mixed between lawyers who practiced in
firms of less than 10 lawyers (27%) and those who practiced in firms of 10-75 lawyers (23%).
Two respondents served as in-house counsel, one for a publicly held company, and the other
for a privately held company. Sarbanes Oxley Survey Responses, supra note 81, at Response
Nos. 5, 12.
86 Survey Results: Corporate Securities Survey, supra note 85.
87 Id. Eight lawyers (31%) indicated that they had practiced corporate and securities
law for seven to twenty years, and six (23%) noted that they had less than seven years of
experience in the practice area. Id.
88 Id. Twenty seven percent devoted 51% to 75% of their practice to corporate and
securities work, and 19% devoted less than 50% of their practice to corporate and securities
work. Id.
89 Id. While thirteen respondents indicated that there has been no change, thirteen other
respondents indicated that complying with the law and related rules had changed the way they
represent public entities. Id.
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awareness and liability exposure for corporate executives appears to have
contributed to the constituents becoming more demanding. 94 These results are
consistent with reports that I received from interviewed lawyers. 95 While
noting that Sarbanes-Oxley has not changed her practice much, one
interviewee referred to the "post-Enron mindset" of client representatives who
are now more sensitive to issues such as fiduciary duty. 96 The lawyer stated
that before Enron, she might have had "to preach all day; but now, in a post-
Enron world, it is easier to explain to constituents the issues and their
exposure., 97 Other interviewees shared similar sentiments, commenting on the
increased sensitivity of corporate officers and heightened attention to
compliance matters.
98
The receptivity of clients to lawyers' advice and counselling suggests that
Sarbanes-Oxley may be impacting the dynamics of the lawyer-client
relationship. A number of respondents commented on the leverage that
Sarbanes-Oxley gives lawyers in dealing with corporate representatives. 9 As
stated by one respondent, "Although we discuss the same issues with public
entities as we did prior to adoption of the Standards, we cite the Standards as
additional support for appropriately addressing the issues."' 1° With respect to
"up-the-ladder" reporting obligations, one respondent stated, "In the past, there
was a lot of give and take on certain issues. Now there is less."''° This last
comment suggests that Sarbanes-Oxley and the Standards have limited the
flexibility that lawyers previously had in dealing with corporate
representatives. To some, this lack of flexibility provides "leverage" that
lawyers can use if constituents act in a manner detrimental to the client-
entity.'0 2 As explained by one respondent, Sarbanes-Oxley "creates some
brighter lines for attorneys and gives them more leverage with obstreperous
business clients."'
0 3
To some, the additional exposure under Sarbanes-Oxley has also
contributed to lawyers enging in a kind of defensive lawyering, called
"CYA" by one respondent. As stated by the respondent, "It used to be just
94 See id. As described by one respondent, "[Tlhe stakes are much higher, and outside
directors are more inquisitive and demanding." Id. at Response No. 13.
95 Interviews with Anonymous Sources (2004) (interview notes on file with author)




99 See Sarbanes Oxley Survey Responses, supra note 81.
10o Id. at Response No. 18.
1o Id. at Response No. 16.
102 See, e.g., id. at Response Nos. 17-20, 24.
103 Id. at Response No. 5.
104 Id. at Response No. 9.
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malpractice you worried about, now it is jail. This is now a no-risk-is-
acceptable environment.' 0 5 As a result, lawyers may be documenting more,
resulting in more legal work and higher costs for clients. 106 One respondent
described this effect in stating that s/he is "more likely to maintain formal
notes of advice rendered."' 07
Various survey comments specifically refer to the impact that Sarbanes-
Oxley has had in creating additional work for lawyers.'w Four respondents
explained that they are spending more time on regulatory work, including
handling reporting and disclosure issues and complying with new SEC
Standards. The following comment describes the nature of the additional
work:
Sarbanes-Oxley has greatly increased the time and effort for
clients and counsel to comply with prior securities law
requirements, not to mention many wholely [sic] new
requirements. A lot of that effort is one time start up work,
but much of it is ongoing. The education (about the new
requirements) and documentation of both new and existing
procedures are extensive. In addition, there is the work to
interpret a huge number of the new rules created in a short
time without adequate comment and thought . . . .The
increased items to be documented by boards and committees
have led to longer meetings and more lawyer input for the
directors.110
Interviewees described the increase in legal work at two levels: one for
public companies that want to remain public and the second for public
105 Id.
106 See, e.g., id. at Response No. 26. See also Bobelian, supra note 59, at 3. Noting that
"firms [are] asking more inquisitive questions of clients and documenting oral conversations
and internal decisions," Kevin Rosen, the head of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher's legal malpractice
defense group, said that "lawyers are more aware of the changing perception of their role and as
a result ... are taking certain steps to ensure recognition that they are complying." Id.
(alteration in original).
107 Sarbanes Oxley Survey Responses, supra note 81, at Response No. 28.
108 See id. at Response Nos. 18, 23, 26, 28.
109 See id. Another respondent noted that s/he has "seen increased calls by in house
counsel on routine disclosure items (where Sarbox has made no changes directly in the law) as
well as changes in governance standards." Id. at Response No. 28.
110 Id. at Response No. 26. The respondent also bemoans the uncertainty surrounding
adoption of the new SEC Standards. See id. The respondent stated that "[tihere are also areas
where the SEC and D[O]J have been slow to give any guidance about the meaning of coverage
of new requirements." Id.
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companies that want to go private."1' First, interviewees referred to the initial
upsurge in demand for lawyer services becausepublic clients sought lawyer's
assistance in creating policies and committees.' 2 A number of interviewees
also noted that the increased scrutiny, requirements, and costs for public
companies have resulted in an increase in a second type of work-assisting
public clients that want to "deregister" and "go private." ' 1 3 Similarly, because
of the increased costs and requirements for public issues, private clients are
now less drawn by the "going public" lure.' 
4
Survey respondents were also evenly split on the question of whether the
SEC Standards have changed the way they represent "non-public"
companies. " 5 Thirteen respondents reported that their representation had not
changed; however, the other thirteen respondents reported that the legislation
and related standards had changed the way they represented "non-public"
companies.'1 6 One respondent commented that the change is "not . . .
dramatic" 1 17 and another stated that the change is "not great.
' ' 8
One change described by three respondents is that some "non-public"
companies have started to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley to prepare for a public
offering in the future."19 Other comments suggest that Sarbanes-Oxley
changed representation of non-public clients because Sarbanes-Oxley now
represents "industry standard,"' setting forth principles that apply equally to
public and non-public companies.12' Another respondent explained that, in
representing non-public companies, lawyers are "more insistent on process and
formality in business dealings."' 22 In dealings with non-public companies, two
respondents referred to the leverage that Sarbanes-Oxley gives them in dealing
with clients. One stated, "We cite the Standards as additional support for
m Interviews, supra note 95.
112 Id. One interviewee noted that the increase in business for lawyers was less than
some expected because so many law firms were "giving it away" in an effort to cultivate
relationships with clients and build reputations as Sarbanes-Oxley experts. Id.
113 Id.
114 See id.
115 Survey Results: Corporate Securities Survey, supra note 85.
116 Id.
117 Sarbanes Oxley Survey Responses, supra note 81, at Response No. 12.
118 Id. at Response No. 25.
119 See id. at Response Nos. 5, 19, 28.
120 Id. at Response No. 10.
121 Id. at Response No. 11. One respondent noted that accountants "are now imposing
some public company standards to private company audit[s] and other accounting procedures."
Id. at Response No. 16.
122 Id. at Response No. 11.
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appropriately addressing the issues." The other explained that Sarbanes-Oxley
"does provide somewhat more weight to objections we might have."'
' 23
To further explore how Sarbanes-Oxley might impact lawyers' dealings
with clients, the on-line survey asked respondents whether they changed the
way they interact with corporate representatives.' 24 Again, respondents were
evenly split on this question with thirteen answering "no" and thirteen
answering "yes."' 125 When asked to describe the changes, two commented on
the importance of reminding clients of Sarbanes-Oxley issues,"26 and three
respondents referred to the new requirement of "going upstairs."'
127
Regarding the "up-the-ladder" requirement, I asked interviewees whether
they believed that corporate lawyers were going up the corporate ladder before
Sarbanes-Oxley.128  Six experienced corporate lawyers reported that they
believed knowledgeable lawyers were already going up the corporate ladder
and withdrawing when necessary.' 29 Three expressed the view that before
Sarbanes-Oxley, lawyers may not have gone to the board, but rather stopped
after communicating the problem to manager-constituents such as the chief
executive officers.13
The vast majority of respondents agreed that Sarbanes-Oxley has affected
lawyer's exposure for legal malpractice.' 31 Eighty-five percent of the
respondents answered affirmatively when asked whether Sarbanes-Oxley and
the SEC Standards affect the professional liability exposure of lawyers.
132
While respondents described different avenues for expanding lawyer
liability,133 the general sentiment was that Sarbanes-Oxley at least makes it
marginally easier to pursue claims against lawyers.' 34 In describing how
Sarbanes-Oxley has increased the exposure of lawyers, three respondents
indicated that lawyers could be now held liable if they do not meet the new
standards and obligations. 35 A correlative view was that Sarbanes-Oxley
123 Id. at Response No. 12.
124 Corporate/Securities Practice Survey, supra note 78.
125 Survey Results: Corporate Securities Survey, supra note 85.
126 Id. at Response Nos. 7, 18.
127 Id. at Response Nos. 19, 20, 24.
128 Interviews, supra note 95.
129 Id.
130 Id. As explained by one interviewee, before Sarbanes-Oxley lawyers could justify
stopping at management or withdrawing without going to the board. Id. Another interviewee
made a similar observation on "stopping with management." Id.
131 Survey Results: Corporate Securities Survey, supra note 85.
132 Id.
133 See Sarbanes Oxley Survey Responses, supra note 81, at Response Nos. 10-12, 15,
19, 24.
134 See, e.g., Response No. 5.
135 See id. at Response Nos. 12, 26, 27.
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could "actually diminish" exposure if lawyers comply with the new
standards. 136 One respondent expressed the opposite opinion in asserting that
"the standard of practice has been raised immensely."' To limit liability, one
respondent emphasized the importance of lawyers documenting compliance
with standards, including steps taken to "go up the chain.' 38
V. CONCLUSION
Information obtained in my survey and interviews, coupled with media
accounts, indicates that lawyer uproar over Sarbanes-Oxley and the proposed
SEC Standard on "up-the-ladder" reporting could be compared to Chicken
Little in the childhood story. Chicken Little declared that the sky was falling
when an acorn fell on its head. 139 Much like Chicken Little who crusaded to
warn the community, 14 various lawyers and commentators railed against SEC
proposed standards, especially the proposed noisy withdrawal. The lawyer
uproar appeared to have the immediate effect of contributing to the SEC
postponing adoption of the noisy withdrawal provisions, while adopting the
"up-the-ladder" requirement.
One year after the effective date of the "up-the-ladder" requirement,
various practitioners report that the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC
Standards has not been dramatic. 141 While many corporate lawyers indicate
that they were already going "up-the-ladder," 2 the requirement to do so
provides lawyers with leverage in dealing with recalcitrant or unyielding
constituents who refuse to act in the best interest of the organization.' 3 When
dealing with corporate managers, lawyers report that Sarbanes-Oxley has made
the clients more receptive to lawyer counseling on proper conduct.
44
Lawyers, like client representatives, are more concerned about liability.
This heightened sensitivity has forced lawyers and their firms to devote more
time to ethics training and compliance.145 Basic ethics training related to "up-
the-ladder" reporting, coupled with the widespread debate on Sarbanes-Oxley
and the SEC Standards, has raised the consciousness of non-corporate
136 Id. at Response No. 12.
137 Id. at Response No. 9.
138 Id. at Response No. 15. One commentator predicted this reaction by noting that
lawyers would protect themselves by "documenting every step [they take] in handling [a]
problem." Tamara Loomis, Lawyer Rules Proposed by SEC: But New Disclosure
Requirements Met with Heavy Opposition, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 7, 2002, at 1.
139 SALLY HOBSON, CHICKEN LrrrLE (Aladdin Paperbacks 1999) (1800s).
140 Id.
141 See, e.g., Sarbanes Oxley Survey Responses, supra note 81, at Response No. 12.
142 See id. at Response Nos. 4, 13, 26, 28.
143 See id. at Response Nos. 5, 12, 18.
144 Id.
145 See id. at Response Nos. 23, 26.
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lawyers.'46 While corporate lawyers generally understood the principles of
entity representation, lawyers in other practice areas may not fully recognize
the ethical obligations of organization representation. Now, with post-
Sarbanes-Oxley eyes, employment lawyers representing unions, tax lawyers
representing non-profit organizations, litigators handling commercial disputes,
and other lawyers representing organizations should better appreciate their
duties to protect the entities rather than their constituents. Long term, this
reorientation or reexamination of responsibilities may prove to be the greatest
impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on lawyer conduct, even though the Act may not
technically apply to the circumstances of representation.
For corporate lawyers, Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC Standards underscore
lawyers' duties to the entity. Moreover, possible enforcement actions against
lawyers and increased public scrutiny remind lawyers of their liability147
exposure. As a result, corporate lawyers may take less comfort in relying on
court holdings that limit private actions based on violations of securities
lawyers.1 48 One lawyer described this change by referring to Sarbanes-Oxley's
"ulcerative effect" in causing lawyers to worry about civil liability, as well as
government enforcement actions.
This effect parallels the consequences of SEC actions against lawyers in
the 1970s, as well as banking regulators claims against lawyers in the 1980s.
Like securities lawyers in the 1970s and financial institution lawyers in the
1980s, corporate lawyers now are reassessing their roles in representing
entities and are taking steps to limit their liability.
By analogy to brides at weddings, Sarbanes-Oxley presents something old,
something new, something borrowed, and something blue. For lawyers, the
something old is the "up-the-ladder" reporting. At the same time, the "new"
feature of Sarbanes-Oxley is that the "up-the-ladder" requirement is
mandatory. Borrowed from the 1970s and 1980s are government regulators'
attempts to use enforcement actions to force lawyers to act in ways that the
regulators believe to be consistent with professional responsibilities of
gatekeepers. Finally, the lawyers themselves are "blue" when they conclude
that the new requirements increase their professional liability exposure.
150
Such concern over civil liability captures lawyers' attention more than
disciplinary rules or ethics opinions. If concern over liability exposure
146 Interviews, supra note 95. See also Sarbanes Oxley Survey Responses, supra note
81.
147 See Sarbanes Oxley Survey Responses, supra note 81, at Response Nos. 18, 28.
148 E.g., Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191
(1994) (eliminating private causes of action for aiding and abetting federal securities law
violations by secondary actors); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200-01 (1976)
(requiring scienter for civil liability claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
149 Interviews, supra note 95.
150 See Sarbanes Oxley Survey Responses, supra note 81, at Response Nos. 18, 28.
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contributes to corporate and non-corporate lawyers focusing more on ethical
representation of organizations, Sarbanes-Oxley effectively raises the ethical
bar for all lawyers.

